By Andrew Coyne, Postmedia News, February 26, 2013
So many of the well-known ills of our politics have their roots in the way we count the votes, writes Andrew Coyne.
Since the idea of an electoral reform pact was first broached — not by me, but by Elizabeth May of the Green Party, by Nathan Cullen of the NDP, and latterly by Joyce Murray in the Liberal leadership race — reaction has split into two camps. Among each party’s members, the notion of a one-time alliance formed around the need to fix our broken electoral system plainly excites some interest: it propelled Cullen’s long-shot campaign for party leader into contention, as it may be doing for Murray’s. Yet it is dismissed by much of the respective party establishments, as it would seem by most of the punditocracy.
The critics’ objections, in the main, are four. 1. It would be difficult to do. 2. It is unnecessary: the opposition parties will one day defeat the Conservatives, without such a pact. 3. The public would never go for it: not a coalition, or not one with such a narrow focus. 4. If they did win, it is unclear how such a coalition would govern.
The first is undoubtedly true. There are, indeed, any number of reasons why this probably won’t happen. What’s being discussed is whether it should. Suffice it to say that if the party leaders think it should, it will. None of the many questions the critics raise — how would the parties agree on a single candidate? who sets the rules? in which ridings? etc. — are insurmountable, in themselves. All that is required is the will.
Of course, whether that will exists, or is likely to, is heavily dependent on the second point. So long as each side thinks it can win without co-operating, they won’t. And yes, at some point, the Conservatives will be defeated. The question is by whom, or what — and when.
If defeating the Conservatives were all, the parties could arguably afford to wait each other out — though the longer they wait, the more time the Conservatives will have to adjust the rules to their advantage. But if electoral reform is the objective, the wait-and-see option looks less tenable.
This is the paradox at the heart of the issue. Whatever the parties may say they believe in, unless it is also in their self-interest it won’t happen. My argument is that we are currently witnessing just such an exceptional alignment of the planets: not only do all three opposition parties now favour reform of some kind, but, in an inversion of the norm, they are unlikely to win power without it.
The first-past-the-post system presents a formidable obstacle, as is well known, given the (apparently enduring) division of the “progressive” vote between the three (four, in Quebec) parties. And while it is easy to say they should just form a coalition or even merge, not every such arrangement is as likely to succeed. There is a reason why the three parties exist as separate entities: because there are real differences between them. The more permanent any proposed coalition was, and the more ambitious its ideological reach, the more it would bleed votes, especially to the right.
On the other hand, a coalition that confined itself to the objective of fixing the electoral system would be less likely to put off centrist voters. Having reformed the system, moreover, they would find vote-splitting was no longer an issue: their majority in the popular vote would now translate into a majority of the seats.
But would the voters go for it — objection three? The talking points write themselves: while the Tories were focused on bread-and-butter issues, the opposition would offer a motley alliance united only by an abstraction like electoral reform. And if no one thinks ahead — if everyone concedes the argument in advance — then of course that is how it would play out.
If you never make the case for electoral reform, then yes, it will remain an abstraction in the public mind. But if you believe it is necessary, presumably it is because of the real-world problems of the current system. So many of the well-known ills of our politics — the phoney majorities, the exaggerated regional divisions, the lack of competition for so many seats, the obsession with a narrow slice of swing voters, the lack of serious debate, the sheer partisan nastiness — have their roots in the way we count the votes.
How could they not? That is what decides who gets into power, and how. As such, it rewards a certain kind of political behaviour, and not others — the sort of behaviour that results in falling turnout, declining interest in Parliament, and a general sense among many voters that they are not represented by our politics. You want better bread-and-butter policies? You have to fix our politics. And one part of fixing politics is to fix the system. The opposition has two years to make that case. If they believe in it, they will.
All very well, but — objection four — how would it work in practice? Single issue elections are not unknown to our politics: 1988 was one. Neither are coalitions, with all of the last-minute haggling over cabinet seats and the like these entail. If it would allay the critics’ fears, the parties could agree upon a short program of government, in addition to the central objective of electoral reform. No doubt other issues would arise in the interim, but there’s nothing new in that.
Of course, if you don’t think electoral reform is needed, none of this will make sense to you. But then that is your real objection.
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